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A Look at the Future: Canada and the United States in the
Future World Economic Context-Can We Be Competitive?
Dr. James D. Fleck*
CAN

WE BE COMPETITIVE?

My remarks this morning concern the competitiveness of the American

and Canadian economies in the global environments that we see
emerging over the next decade and beyond. I propose to put my remarks
into a framework that takes account of the changes that are affecting the
environment that firms in these two countries face. Issues of competitiveness can be looked at in terms of changes that are occurring in the
trading system and the adjustments that need to be made in the industrial
system in reaction to these changes. Thus, trade and adjustment is the
context within which we will view competitiveness in North America.
It is indeed quite remarkable how much agreement can be reached
about the general proposition that the world is undergoing a major process of economic restructuring, a process that amounts in effect to a
revolution in the global economic order. What is even more remarkable
is that underlying much of the structural change that is taking place is an
unprecedented process of international coordination of the rules of conduct of business activity that crosses international boundaries. I refer to
the apparently inexorable pressures for liberalization of trade rules and
removal of trade barriers under the GATT. Despite endless debate, and
against a continuous background of protectionist protest, the nations of
the GATT have managed to establish a truly liberal trading system that
has brought about that uniquely late-twentieth-century phenomenon
known as the "global market"; a market where firms compete across national boundaries, apparently as easily as they once did across single cities and states.
Equally important, though less apparent to the casual observer, is
the international integration of financial markets brought about by agreements among these same nations for coordination of systems to facilitate
international payments and capital flows. In particular, the linkage between financial institutions for the electronic exchange of financial assets
has created a global financial system of awesome capacity.
While it is apparently a simple matter to arrive at general agreement
about the nature of global integration of trade and financial flows, it is
paradoxically difficult to reach agreement about how nations and firms
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can learn to cope with their consequences. I refer, of course, to the pains
of transition that result from the losses of market share of traditional
businesses in the developed world and the consequent loss of jobs and the
means of livelihood for the millions of workers employed by these businesses. Every national government in the developed world finds itself
beleagured by clamors for action by the displaced who claim that it is
their right to be "protected" from the impacts of the forces of change.
Reaching agreement at a national level about appropriate policies to
cushion the injuries that result from such change appears difficult. Arriving at international agreement appears well nigh impossible.
It appears to me that debate on the problems of adjustment has
come to be focused almost exclusively on public policy imperatives. The
problem tends to get defined in terms of the solution - compensation
schemes for trade-related injury, transition subsidies, Voluntary Marketing Arrangements, countervails, industrial renewal programs, and the
like. Many of these solutions are mere "band-aids" that at best can buy a
little time for true adjustment processes to take root and show results.
More commonly, they tend to exacerbate the problem by temporarily
relieving the pressures on selected groups at great social costs.
My proposition is that it is useful to shift the focus of our attention
away from public policy solutions and onto the business policy issues of
adjustment at the level of the firm. We need to gain a better understanding of how the individual business can define its own adjustment problem, an understanding of the strategies and course of action it can
undertake to become a beneficiary rather than a victim of the forces of
change, an understanding of what it takes for a business to survive and
prosper in a global marketplace. Once we have reached some form of
consensus about adjustment at the level of the firm, we can turn our attention back to the public policy issues of what governments and international bodies can do to create a climate within which these firm-level
processes can work. By this process we can have some hope of avoiding
the dangers of defining the problems of adjustment in terms of our favorite public policy solutions, and focus our attention instead on adjustment
process as a business. I am confident that public policies which are developed from this course of reasoning stand a better chance of success in
the long run because they will be more firmly grounded in the realities
that confront the key actor in the adjustment process-the business firm.
I have chosen to direct my attention to the manufacturing sector,
both because that is a sector where much of the adjustment problem exists and because it is a sector with which I have some familiarity. My
argument will proceed in three stages. First, I propose to demonstrate
that successful adjustment in the manufacturing sector must be accompanied by significant and continuous growth in output per worker. Next, I
will direct our attention to the business policy issues of managing the
growth in output per worker, with specific attention to the special
problems of managing a productive organization that becomes increas-
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ingly knowledge-intensive. During this part of my talk I intend to draw
heavily on the experiences of my own firm, mainly because it is the organization that I know best. I have, however, endeavored to limit my
remarks to issues which I believe have general applicability to manufacturing operations in the OECD countries. Last, I have some tentative
suggestions about the public policy implications of these ideas. I offer
these as propositions which you may wish to consider and debate, rather
than as solutions to the problems of adjustment with which our governments are trying to cope.
Let me begin then with a description of the issues of adjustment in
manufacturing in the OECD countries.
ADJUSTMENT IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR

Considerable confusion exists about the role of manufacturing in the
modem, high-level economies of the OECD countries. Manufacturing's
share of Gross Domestic Product has been steadily declining in all the
OECD countries, leading some observers to conclude that manufacturing
itself is on the decline. Support for this viewpoint-the so-called
deindustrialization of the developed economies-is buttressed by evidence of the growth of their imports of manufactured products from the
NICs (Newly Industrializing Countries) and the rest of the Third World.
The manufacture of traditional labor-intensive products is no longer viable in the OECD countries because of the high cost of labor. Unless they
are protected by trade restrictions (tariffs, quotas, VMAs), such businesses will succumb to import competition. Initially, such competitors
were located in the NICs - Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, for example. Now, the NICs are under intense pressure from competition from
Third World countries with even lower labor costs - Thailand and Sri
Lanka, for example. As a consequence, the NICs are reducing their dependence on such industries and shifting into more capital and knowledge-intensive manufacturing. The resulting multi-tiered international
division of labor in manufacturing has been likened to a "cascade" by
Japanese industrial strategist, Miyohei Shinohara.
In those OECD economies which have successfully adapted to the
new realities of global competition, manufacturing shipments continue to
grow in real terms. In the United States, Japan, and West Germany, the
long term trend in the real value of manufacturing output has continued
to be healthy, although it has been subject to serious cyclical fluctuations.
However, in these countries, the output of other sectors of the economy
has grown even faster, so that manufacturing has lost a little ground in
relative terms.
In other countries, such as the United Kingdom and Canada, where
adaptation to the new global environment has not been as successful,
manufacturing is down in both absolute and relative terms. Loss of output due to competition from low wage countries is not being sufficiently
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counterbalanced by increases in output from the newer forms of manufacturing that are better suited for survival in economies with a high
standard of living.
The decline of manufacturing output in Canada has been accompanied by an even larger loss of employment in manufacturing. Manufacturing accounts for a declining proportion of the workforce in Canada.
This is a long term trend that has been occurring over the last three
decades and will most likely continue into the future. Manufacturing
accounts for a declining proportion of the civilian workforce in Canada
and can no longer be regarded as the major sector for net new employment creation in the economy, a role that it fulfilled during the earlier
decades of this century.
The combination of slow growth, in real output, with a decline in
employment leads to impressive improvements in productivity. Shipments per employee have increased steadily in Canadian manufacturing.
Continuation of this long term trend is vitally important for the survival
of manufacturing industry in all the OECD countries. This is true both
for the individual business as well as for the manufacturing sector as a
whole. Several factors contribute towards this trend.
First, and most important, is the changing mix of output. As a consequence of the restructuring of the global organization of manufacturing
activity described above, the production of traditional, labor-intensive
products is being eliminated from the OECD countries. At the same
time, new products and processes are being introduced. Relatively small
net changes in total output (or employment) may actually mask the quite
significant changes in both directions that lie just beneath the surface.
The second development that influences output per worker in the
OECD countries is the increasing capital intensity of the production
processes used in manufacturing. Obviously, when capital equipment replaces labor, output per worker will rise. Some of the most dramatic
examples of this can be found in electronic assembly operations. These
have traditionally been conducted as labor-intensive operations, and, as a
consequence, tend to be located in low wage cost areas. Several North
American and Japanese electronic assemblers, however, have chosen to
build capital-intensive plants where large numbers of low-paid workers
are replaced by production machinery which utilizes automated
processes, robotics, and mechanical handling equipment. The IBM
plants for assembling personal computers in Boca Raton and IBM's new
printer plant in the United States are both showcase examples of successful capital-intensive facilities in what is traditionally regarded as a laborintensive activity, as is the Ford electronics plant in Markham, Ontario.
In the latter plant, automated systems with a handful of workers produce
output equivalent to that turned out by thousands of workers in the Ford
Electronics plant in Sao Paulo, Brazil. Both plants-the capital-intensive facility in Canada and the labor-intensive one in Brazil-are capable
of manufacturing similar products. Both are roughly equivalent in total
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costs of manufacture. However, they are very different in terms of their
wage rates and their employment.
The North American plants have fewer workers, but each worker
earns a very high wage, compared to counterparts in, say, Brazil or Mexico. Plants in the latter countries are staffed by large numbers of lowpaid workers. Of even greater significance are differences in the proportion of blue-collar work to white-collar and professional work in these
plants. The North American plants are knowledge-intensive - they require people who know how to put knowledge to work. They have need
for large numbers of systems engineers, product designers, industrial engineers, scientists, and technicians. Some of these knowledge workers
may not actually work at the plants themselves. Their work may be accomplished in laboratories, design offices, and other facilities remote
from the plant where their work is used. In fact, some of these knowledge workers may be located in the plants of their customers.
In addition to the presence of large numbers of knowledge workers,
these modern, information-intensive production organizations are also
characterized by an increasing knowledge content in their blue-collar
jobs. Workers on the production floor are required to exercise considerable technical skill in their jobs. In many ways, they are becoming more
and more like knowledge workers as well. In estimating the proportion
of information work in a production organization, we need to go beyond
simple calculations of the ratio of knowledge workers to total workers.
We need also to devise measures of the amount of knowledge work that
blue-collar workers are required to perform.
MANAGEMENT DIMENSIONS OF ADJUSTMENT

Now that we have established that much of the focus of adjustment
in North America, as well as in the economies of the other OECD countries, lies in the manufacturing sector, let us turn our attention to the
management dimensions of the problems of adjustment in that sector.
These are essentially the problems of business strategy for manufacturing
firms. As Chairman and CEO of a medium-sized, but, growing manufacturing firm in North America, these issues occupy a major part of my
time working with the general managers of the various operation
divisions.
I have come to believe that the critical skill for the management of
manufacturing activities in firms like mine will be the deployment of
knowledge workers. These skills are very different from those which are
essential for success in the traditional forms of manufacturing which are
in such rapid decline in Canada and the United States, and indeed in all
the other OECD countries as well. Traditional manufacturing is centered around the control of materials and machines and the supervision
of the relatively low skilled labor required to process products through
simple production systems. Traditional manufacturing management is
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concerned with keeping costs low, keeping product moving out of the
factory door and paying attention to the tangible tasks of inventory management, maintenance of production machinery, control of variable costs
and the like. Most of the formal techniques for managing such traditional manufacturing facilities have been developed by the so-called management scientists or operations researchers who have studied work
performed at individual work stations and large machines which require
many workers to keep them running.
These traditional manufacturing management techniques are reasonably well understood. The skills needed to apply them are quite
broadly available in our manufacturing companies. They are still needed
and valuable in the new forms of manufacturing that will be necessary in
the competitive environment that we will face in the remainder of the
twentieth century and beyond.
These techniques, however, are by no means sufficient for success, or
even for survival. In my firm, and in thousands of other manufacturing
operations in North America and the OECD countries, we need four
additional sets of skills.
First, we need the special skills required to manage capital-intensive
production operations in a profitable manner. As I have shown, the
trend towards increasing capital intensity is a major element in the effort
to increase output per worker. The most demanding management task in
a capital-intensive production system is the maintenance of high product
quality. In a labor-intensive system, quality comes about largely because
of skills of the workers. Highly skilled workers are necessary to produce
high quality products, as anyone who has a weakness for hand-made Italian shoes or hand-tailored shirts knows.
In a capital-intensive operation, quality comes about from the skills
of management and knowledge workers. It calls for the institution and
operation of statistical quality control and quality circles; for the use of
Taguchi experiments to optimize production processes; for the highly
specialized monitoring of incoming materials and production machines;
for the adoption of electronic process control and instrumentation that
far exceed human capacities for measuring, touching, and gauging; for
the use of infra-red and ultra-sonic sensing and the hundreds of other
techniques that have emerged from the laboratories and are now finding
their way on to the factory floor. Managing quality in these operations
has become the job of grafting a knowledge-intensive, quality-conscious
culture on our production systems.
Second, to take full advantage of the production capacity of these
new capital-intensive production systems, we have to learn to manage the
adoption of automation. High volume machines need high volume systems to feed materials, to manipulate materials in process, and to remove
finished products. The adoption of automation is highly knowledge-intensive. It calls for skills in selection and installation of highly specialized equipment, skills in scheduling and inventory management,
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knowledge of robotics, and the ability to integrate individual mechanical
operations into an interdependent system through electronics.
Third, we need to recognize the impact of increasing capital-intensity on the cost structure of manufacturing. Whenever we convert a labor-intensive operation into a capital-intensive one, we move from a high
variable, low fixed-cost structure, into one where a larger proportion of
total costs are fixed. Making money in a high fixed-cost operation calls
for special attention to capacity utilization. We can no longer rely on
layoffs and shutdowns to cope with variations in demand. We have to
keep the operation running at a high level of capacity to cover our fixed
costs. This calls for the exercise of different skills in marketing and general management. It requires development of new costing systems to replace our traditional practices of treating costs as the sum of materials,
labor, and an overhead burden which is assigned as a percentage of labor
hours.
More than anything else, capacity utilization becomes a matter of
integrating marketing and production. Our general managers and marketing managers have to work closely with our customers to integrate
our production planning systems with theirs. We have to institute arrangements for our computer systems for production planning and
materials control, and be linked directly with their computer systems for
purchasing. More important, we have to understand and participate in
their business strategy processes because we must develop our business
strategies in harmony with their plans. These vertical systems for integrated strategy development will be an important element in the ability
of North American industry to undertake the adjustments necessary for
long term survival and prosperity. In the industries that my firm
serves-the automotive, electronics and major appliances industriessuch vertical systems for strategy development are already beginning to
take shape.
Last, the most difficult management task in capital-intensive production operations is the maintenance of flexibility. Traditional capitalintensive North American plants are notoriously inflexible. They are optimized for high volume production of rigidly specified outputs. Not so
our markets. Consumer preferences and tastes are volatile. Demand
fluctuates. Our customers are changing their product mix. Their own
markets are volatile and their needs are constantly changing. They are
adopting just-in-time purchasing systems and flexible procurement practices. We cannot afford to allow our capital-intensive facilities to become
inflexible.
Building flexibility into a capital-intensive production operation
calls for a very high level of management skill, from the supervisor on the
production floor, through middle management within and outside the
factory, right up to the general managers themselves. Everyone must
learn to become more responsive and more flexible. Everyone must be
engaged in forward planning and anticipation. We need to understand
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how to combine concerns for flexibility with the need to maintain high
levels of capacity utilization. We cannot optimize one at the expense of
the other. We have to learn to do both, and to do them well.
The second major area of concern in the development of knowledge
workers involves the adoption of new technology. When we discuss technology in a forum such as this, we tend to focus our attention on the
glamorous hi-tech industries-computers, bio-technology, exotic materials, aircraft, and the like. We speak of strategies and national policies to
create and operate hi-tech businesses and the research and development
activity necessary to sustain them. I feel that it is equally vital to concern
ourselves about the adoption of technology by lo-tech and no-tech businesses. These businesses require technology strategies just as much as
the hi-tech businesses. They need to pay organized attention to the new
knowledge being created by our technological infrastructure. They need
to develop competitive advantages through the adoption of new technologies, to keep up with technology development by their customers and
their competitors and to remain alert to opportunities which arise from
technology advances by their suppliers.
At a very minimum, technology strategies in non-hi-tech manufacturing must be concerned with two areas: materials technology and
electronics.
Advances in materials technology offer opportunities for improvements in product quality and manufacturing costs. Managers of even the
most mundane production operation can discover exciting opportunities
for significant benefits from the use of engineered plastics, new metal alloys, process supplies, lubricants, and synthetic chemicals. While it is
not necessary for these managers to learn the underlying technologies of
these new materials, it is vital for them to be aware of the potential benefits of their use. They must learn to develop efficient systems for scanning the relevant technological environment, to institute practices for
regular experimentation with new materials in their own operations and
to develop skills in making decisions about the adoption of new materials
technology.
Similarly, managers of non hi-tech businesses must learn to take full
advantage of the ever-increasing opportunities for improving their operations through the use of electronics. Much of the new technology for
using electronics in production operations is of an add-on nature. It is
well adapted for incorporation into existing production machinery. One
often does not have to wait until it is time to replace equipment before
one adopts electronic means of controlling production operations. Just
as the personal computer has revolutionized the office environment, it
can be used to make significant improvements in all kinds of factory situations. Together with microprocessor-based electronic instrumentation,
it can help the factory manager improve every aspect of even the most
mundane production operation.
A major challenge for many manufacturing managers is the acquisi-
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tion of computer literacy and a basic knowledge of the use of electronics
in production. While the ubiquitous slide rule has been buried deep in
the bottom of a pile of academic memorabilia, many manufacturing managers have not buried the slide rule mentality they strove so hard to acquire in engineering or technical school. They have not learned to trust
computational processes they cannot see and heuristics they cannot
touch. The processes of adjusting our production operations to the new
knowledge intensive ways of working will be surely hampered by a lack
of electronic literacy in manufacturing management.
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT

The third challenge for those engaged in managing knowledge-intensive manufacturing operations is in the area of product development.
New products are the means whereby a dynamic firm constantly renews
its operations. With the changes in the market environment described
above, manufacturing firms in North America have to adopt aggressive
strategies for new product development. The processes for designing and
launching new products in a manufacturing environment that is both
capital and knowledge-intensive are exceedingly complex. Managing
such complexity calls for a high order of skill - skill in designing the
product to meet the needs of the marketplace and yet remain compatible
with the dominant production processes; skill in preserving flexibility and
yet maintaining a high level of capacity utilization; skill in taking advantage of the latest developments in materials and production technology.
Successful new product development also requires intensive involvement with customers. Here, again, the vertical systems for strategy development come into play. In managing the new product development
process, our general managers have to be sensitive to the problems and
opportunities that come about from the need to coordinate strategy development with our customers. While in most cases, the strategies of our
customers provide the leadership momentum for the new product development process, our general managers have to remain alert to opportunities for us to exercise leadership.
Let us turn now to the fourth and final area where the management
of a knowledge intensive production organization differs from that of a
traditional manufacturing operation - the need for systems integration.
The concept of systems integration as a separate and distinct management activity in a manufacturing operation owes its origin to the
work of the aerospace companies and defense contractors. In building
large sophisticated products such as spacecraft, commercial jetliners, or
weapons that consisted of several subsystems, each of which was highly
sophisticated in itself, these firms discovered that they needed to pay special attention to the problems of integrating the components so that the
whole system functioned efficiently as a unit. Without deliberate attention to systems integration right from the earlier stages of design concep-
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tualization through to the delivery to the customer and indeed beyond to
post installation service and maintenance, it becomes obvious that the
very complexity of the component subsystems and their underlying technologies threatened to turn the whole project into chaos. Thus was born
the modem concept of systems integration as a separate and vital part of
the management of large complex projects in high technology industries.
It is becoming increasingly necessary to learn to apply these concepts in the less esoteric world of non-hi-tech manufacturing. We have
to recognize that our manufacturing operations are rapidly becoming
complex systems composed of subsystems that are themselves becoming
increasingly complex. We have, therefore, to learn to apply the techniques of systems integration that the aerospace and defense companies
pioneered. We have to pay separate and distinct attention to the management of the systems integration process. This in turn calls for the
development of managerial skills that were previously considered unnecessary in the traditional manufacturing establishment.
These four new priorities for management activity-operation of
capital-intensive facilities, the adoption of technology, the continuous
quest for new products, and the integration of complex systems-are the
major areas of concern when one sets about changing a traditional manufacturing operation to successfully adapt to the new world of knowledgeintensive competition.
Let me now take a few moments to illustrate these ideas with a prac-.
tical example drawn from my own industry. The traditional auto parts
supplier focused his attention on keeping costs low, on following instructions from the automaker regarding the design of parts that he produced,
and on servicing the needs of his customer in whatever manner the customer required. In practice this often meant that suppliers treated the
purchasing managers as the primary customer, and provided whatever
service the particular purchasing manager demanded.
This comfortable way of doing business became obsolete when the
major automakers decided to convert from a high fixed-cost structure to
one where a larger proportion of their costs became variable, a process
that they have sometimes called reduction of their break-even levels.
One major policy to accomplish the change in their cost structure was to
shift towards the use of the Full Service Supplier. This involved transferring a large part of the fixed costs of parts design and engineering to the
parts supplier. At the same time, the automakers were intent on keeping
the lid on the costs of parts and even reducing them wherever possible.
The only way they had to convince suppliers to take on the responsibility for a large part of the fixed costs, without an increase in price, was
to promise them substantially more volume. To accomplish this the
automakers embarked upon a program of supplier consolidation - reducing the number of suppliers, and giving each one of the survivors a
larger chunk of the business than it had before.
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The full service supplier becomes part of the team. Strategies for
this team must be developed in harmony with the other team members.
This is what I mean by vertical strategy coordination. The parts supplier
needs to be able to plan as far ahead into the future as the automaker if
he is to perform his full service job well. He must be able to anticipate
needs and move to set in place the plants, equipment, and systems to
fulfill them. He needs to get involved in the design and manufacture of
the components that he uses in making the parts that he supplies. He
must also be in a position to provide leadership to the team when it
comes to the adoption of new technologies and cost reduction.
To successfully implement this concept, a full service supplier must
carry on activities ranging from research and development, to advanced
engineering and design, to electronic distribution, just-in-time delivery,
and post-manufacturing support. By comparing these activities with
those of a traditional supplier it becomes quite obvious that the two businesses are as different as night and day. The new way of doing business is
highly capital-intensive, requires skill in the adoption of new technology,
and must continuously be involved in product development. Further, the
complexity of the business demands that deliberate attention be paid to
systems integration.
Finally, to remain competitive in the long run, the parts supplier
must begin to work on development of a new generation of computer
system for design and development. Not only must this new system be
capable of supporting CAD (Computer Aided Design) and CAM (Computer Aided Manufacturing) activities, but it also must be capable of supporting the inter-organizational design coordination work that will be
necessary to ensure that the full service concept is translated into practice. In my firm we are beginning to examine the use of the newer forms
of Fifth Generation computers for some of these tasks.
PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Let me now conclude with a few remarks about the public policy
implications of what I have covered. First, it seems clear to me that
public policy emphasis on downside adjustment- attempting to slow
down or arrest the forces of change-rather than on upside adjustmentfacilitating or even accelerating the change process-is both mistaken
and unfortunate. The changes we are talking about are inevitable. The
forces that are causing them are beyond the control of national governments and international organizations. No single government or even
group of governments can do much good by basing adjustment policies
on the hope that the progress in the world economy can somehow be
stopped. Downside adjustment programs merely delay the adjustment
process, create a false sense of security, and waste precious resources. It
is only by focusing national energy and resources on the opportunities
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and benefits of upside adjustment that our governments have a hope of
making a positive contribution to the adjustment process.
It is indeed unfortunate that so much energy and attention is being
focused on policies to prevent plant closures, which inevitably result in
sustaining unhealthy, unviable businesses. Too much energy and attention is being focused on policies to provide a so-called "temporary" protection against the flood of low-cost imports, policies which frequently
result in temporarily increased profits for the protected businesses which
are then syphoned off into other enterprises. Too much is being focused
on policies like subsidies, where the costs eventually fall on the taxpayers
and consumer, countervailing duties, where the cost eventually falls on
the consumer, while the benefits are garnered by inefficient managers and
businesses.
It would be far better for governments to turn their attention to
programs of upside adjustment, programs designed to facilitate the diffusion of knowledge and technology, programs whose net impact will be to
accelerate change rather than resist it.
Second, I suggest that such upside adjustment must be directed primarily at human capital rather than physical or financial capital. Our
governments, it seems to me, have a responsibility to pay much greater
attention to programs designed to assist our workers and managers in
acquiring the skills and training they will need to contribute towards the
operation of knowledge-intensive production systems. Many of our
workers and managers are woefully deficient in areas such as computer
literacy. So much of the skill of the blue-collar workforce is in manual
dexterity, and so little is in the ability to deal with numbers and ideas.
A large portion of the workforce has yet to accept the basic proposithat
education should not cease when one leaves school, but should
tion
be a lifelong process. We need to encourage our workers to abandon the
objective of a one-career working life and adopt, instead, the concept of a
working life that can consist of three and four careers; and we need to
help them in acquiring the new skills and new knowledge they will need
for their second, third, and fourth careers.
Our governments must come to regard the adjustment process as
one of renewing and enhancing the knowledge base of the workforce.
We may need new forms of educational institutions to accomplish some
of these changes. Our current system of schools, universities, technical
institutes, and the like may be inadequate for a large part of this task.
We may need institutions that take their educational programs into the
factory, for, as we know so well, knowledge is eminently portable. We
may need to direct some of the funds we now spend on industrial grants
and subsidies and use them, instead, to provide long term subsidies to
displaced workers who have lost their jobs because of plant shutdowns or
productivity programs.
We all recognize that our governments come under intense political
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pressures when adjustment problems occur. When a plant or a community is threatened, it is natural for people to turn to their government for
help, and to exert whatever form of influence they have at their disposal.
It is wise for us to recognize that governments have to do something
about such problems, and perhaps more importantly, have to be seen as
doing something. The institution of programs to provide assistance directly to the affected workers, and particularly to help them rebuild their
human capital, can be offered as a substitute for the current approach of
programs that are designed to help the businesses affected.
Third, our governments need to pay more attention to strategies for
of technology. Most national technology strategies are fodiffusion
the
exclusively on the glamorous business of hi-tech. Some of
almost
cussed
these resources would be better used in programs for the diffusion of
technology to lo-tech and no-tech businesses. The benefits of technology
enhancement for a business that has little or no advanced technology can
be quite spectacular. Dollar for dollar, the subsidization of technology
acquisition by non-hi-tech businesses is likely to provide significantly
greater benefits than additional resources directed at hi-tech businesses
which are already heavily subsidized, and this is due to the simple economic law of diminishing returns.
Finally, it would seem to me that programs of upside adjustment
assistance of the sort that I have described should be treated somewhat
differently under trade law than programs of downside adjustment assistance. One of the most unfortunate developments during recent years is
the growth in the use of retaliatory and compensatory measures under
trade laws. The substantial increase in the use of countervail in the
United States is a case in point. It would be quite unfortunate if the use
of these measures is extended to harass governments which are attempting to develop upside adjustment programs aimed at building human
capital and accelerating the diffusion of technology. Our governments
need to get together to define and circumscribe, in a careful and clear
manner, those measures of upside adjustment assistance which we find
mutually acceptable, and to distinguish them from downside adjustment
programs which may remain subject to retaliation. International agreements of this nature can do much to encourage our governments to define the adjustment problem in terms of solutions which focus on upside
adjustment rather than continue with solutions aimed at downside
adjustment.
Canada and the United States can compete. But successful adjustment requires major increases in output per worker. Government policies can improve the environment but industry itself must make the
necessary changes. The management of individual firms in the United
States and Canada must remain competent in the traditional skills and at
the same time must successfully embrace new priorities-operation of
capital-intensive facilities, the adoption of technology, the &ontinuous
quest for new products, and the integration of complex systems- to suc-
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